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THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA IN
THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMF
CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON TRANSPARENCY
IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES
J. 0. ADERIBIGBE
I.

INTRODUCTION
The last four and halfyears witnessed increased calls, within the international financial

community, for greater transparency among its membership, In the conduct of
macroeconomic policy in general, and monetary and financial policies in particular. The
impetus for these calls was perhaps connected with the aftermath ofthe financial crisis that
ravaged the Internationa l financial markets during the second half of the 1990s, which
many observers believed could have been avoided if there was adequate transparency in
the dissemination ofrelevant financial information. Another development that prompted
increased calls for greater transparency was the rapidly changing international environment,
particularly with regard to globalization and greater integration of financial markets.

It is within context that, the need for universally accepted standards, or codes of
good practices, was underscored and a number ofintemational financial institutions were
mandated to develop such standards or codes. The general argument is that the adoption
ofthe internationally recognized standards, or codes of good practices, can help to improve
economic policy making and strengthen the International financial system. Consequently.
the International community had to call upon the IMF and other standard setting agencies
to develop standards/codes.covering a nwnber ofeconomic and financial areas. Including
data dissemination. fiscal, monetary and financial policy transparency. banking regulation
and si1pervision. securities and insurance regulation. accounting. auditing. bankruptcy
and corporate governance.
The objectives ofthis paper are essentially twofold: to tam.iliarize seminar participants with
the code of good practices as it relates to transparency in the conduct of monetary and
financi:il policies: and to ex;unine the role of the Central Bank ofNigeria (CBN) in ensuring
the effective implementation of the Code in Nigeria particularly. against the backdrop of
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the international acceptability of the Code as a standard for gauging how transpafent
monetary and financial policies are In the member countries ofthe International financial
community. For ease of exposition, the paper is divided into four parts. Following this
introduction, part II of the paper presents the background and elements of the Code,
highlighting the rationale for each element. In part Ill, we discuss the role ofthe CBN in the
effective Implementation ofthe Code in Nigeria, while the paper ends with some concluding
remarks in part IV.
II.

BACKGROUND AND ELEMENTS OF THE CODE OF GOOD
PRACTICES ON TRANSPARENCY IN MONET ARY AND
1
FINANCIAL POLICIES
In the aftermath ofthe financial crises that devastated the world financial markets,
particularly in Asia and Latin America between 1996 and 1 998, the international community
felt the need to strengthen the architecture ofthe international monetary and financial system.
Moreover, there are other developments that also prompted central banks and financial
agencies to practice greater transparency in the·conduct oftheir affairs. First, the notion of
transparency has gained popularity among the public, and thereby evoking increasing calls
by different interest groups on central banks.and financial agencies to become more open
about their policies, operations and activities. Second, the recognition by policy makers
that globalization in general, and international integration offinancial markets and products
in particular, requires a greater degree oftransparency ofmonetary and financial policies
and ofregulatory regimes and processes, in order to contain market volatility. Third, the
shift in the ultimate objective ofmonetary policy by a number ofcentral banks to inflation
targeting, which required public disclosure of how these targets are being met so as to
establish credibility, shape expectation, and thereby, strengthen theeffectiv~ ofmonetary
policy. Fourth, the adoption of the General Agreement on Trade and Services, which
placed greater attention on the conduct offinancial services. Finally, revolutionary advances
in communication, which greatly reduced the difficulties, costs, and time delays of
disseminating information to the public.

Materials in this section arc drawn largely from the two documents: Code o f ~ Prw:tjccs on !ADP'SPIFY
in ·Monetary and Financial Poticjg <IMF, July 9. 1999) and Supporting Document to the Code o f ~
Practices on TranSNlffllCy in Monc.!.n.11!!! financial Policies OMF July 24, 2000).
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Underlying the desire for a more robust and strengthened international monetary and financial
system, were the consensus that, inadequat~ transparency contributes to financial crises;
markets are highly vulnerable to Ins~bility In the absence of adequate, reliable and time.ly
information; without adequate Information about the economy and the financial system,
policy makers cannot make good policies and react promptly to unforeseen developments;
and uncertainty a~mt the economy and government policies leads to abrupt and destabilizing
market behaviour. Thu~, greater transparency and better accounta bility was considered
capable of helping to reduce the frequency and severity of financial crises by encouraging
policy adjustments to begin earlier and occur more smoothly, and resolving crises by
reducing uncertainty.
Against the foregoing, the IMF, in collaboration with the Bank for International Settlements

(B 1S), and in consultation with a representative group ofcentral banks, financial agencies,
othe r relevant international and regional organizations, and selected academic experts,
developed the Code in the context of the development of standards and codes for public
disclosure and transparency practices designed to strengthen the international monetary
and financial system. It should be noted that, calls for greater transparency extend across
a\\ide spectrum - to commercial banks, securities and Insurance firms, and other institutions
and participants in financial markets, to government and their policies, and to multinational
institutions, Including the IMF. The adoption ofthe Code ofGood Practices on Transparency
In Monetary and Financial Polic ies is, therefore, part ofa larger focus on transparency.
The Code was approved by the IMF Executi ve Board o n July 9, 1999 and adopted by
the Inte rnational Mo!1etary and Financial Committee (formerly interim Committee) of
the Fund o n September 26, I 999, as a guide for members to increase transparency in the
conduct of these policies. In adopting the Code, the Committee, urged "all [Fund] members
to implement the new Code "The code is analogous to the Code o/Good Practices on
Fiscal Transparency earlie r developed by the Fund and endorsed by the Interim
Committee in April 1998. The objective ofthe Monetary and Financial Policies Code is to
improve trans parency o f the objectives and operational processes governing monetary
and financial policies.
In the context of the Code, transparency refers to an environment in which the
objectives o f po Iicy. its legal, institutional, and economic framework, policy decisions and
the ir ratinnale. data and information related to monetary and financial policies, and the
tet111s ofagencies· accountability. are provided to the public on an understandable, accessible
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and timely basis. The argument for transparency ofmonetary and financial policies is hinged
on two principles. First, monetary and financial policies can be made more effective ifthe
public understands the goals and instruments ofpolicy and ifthe authorities make a credible
commitment to achieving these goals. The Import of tris is that, by making available more
information about monetary and financial policies, good transparency practices promote
the potential efficiency of markets. Second, good governance calls for central banks and
financial agencies to be accountable, particularly where the monetary authorities and financial
agencies are endowed with a high degree ofautonomy. The code is thus expected to assist
in achieving the expectations ofthe stakeholders. And when conflicts arise between or
within government units In which responsibilities are shared, transparency in the mandate
and clear rules and procedures in the operations ofthe agencies can help in their resolution.
strengthens governance. and facilitate policy consistency.
The Code contains a listing ofbroad principles related to transparency for monetary
and financial policies that central banks and financial agencies should seek to achieve. A

Supporting Document to the Code ofGood Practices on Transparency in Monetary
and Financial Policies, has been developed by the Fund and approved by Its Executive
Board on July 24, 2000, to facilitate the implementation or the Code. The Supporting
Document, which is a reference source as we ll as an implementation guide, provides a
fuller description ofeach transparency practice embodied in the Code, its rationale in the
context of transparency, where and how it is practiced and some of the practical
considerations in the implemeruation of the Code. While the Code itself expressed the
practices in general terms, the Supporting Documents articulated the principles and guidance
provisions to Implementing the Code and hence, could be viewed as a systematic
presentatio n of a variety of ways central banks practice transparency.
The Code of Good Practices on Tramparency in Monetary and Financial

Policies covers two sets of policies ~d institutions-monetary policies/central banks
and financial policies/financial agencies.2 ' lnough the two sets ofpolicies are interrelated
and mutua lly reinforcing, the division is to cater for the differences in the institutional
arrangements for these policies. The elements of the Code are drawn from a review of
good transpare ncy practices employed In a number of countries and discussed in the
professional literature. It is, therefore, a formalization of the existing practices in most
central- banks and financial agencies. It identifies desirable transparency practices for central
banks in their conduct ofmonetary policy and for central banks and other financial agencies
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in their conduct of financial policies. The Code contains four (4) broad elements, namely:
clarity of roles, responsibilities, and objectives of central banks for
monetary policy and of financial agencies for financial policies;
open process for formulating and reporting monetary policy
decisions by the central banks and of financial policies by financial
agencies;
public availability ofinformation on monetary and financial policies;
and
accountability and assurances of the integrity by the central banks
and financial agencies.
The Code demands that rules and policies be clear and transparent while relevant
financial information are expected to be comprehensive and discussed promptly.
I.
On matters relating to the roles, responsibilities and objectives of central banks
and financial agencies, the Code recommends that key features be clearly specified in the
authorizing legislation (e.g. a central bank law) while the relationship between the various
operations/agencies or any agency role performed on behalf of government be clearly
defined or publicly disclosed. A clear statement ofthe ultimate objectives and institutional
framework ofmonetary and financial policies identifies the mandate and the extem of
responsibilities ofthe relevant agencies. Specifying these in the legislation gives them
particular prominence thereby, avoiding ad hoc and frequent changes to these important
aspects ofcentral banks and relevant financial agencies. Furthermore, the public will be in
a position to compare outcomes with goals and hold the parties with responsibilities for
achieving specific objectives accountable for their attainment.
II.
With regard to issues pertaining to the open process for formulating and reporting
monetary policy decisions and financial policies, the Code, among other guidelines,
recommends that the framework, instruments and any targets that are used to pursue the
objectives of monetary policy should be publicly disclosed and explained and the case of
financial policies, the conduct ofpolicies by financial agencies should be transpan:nt,
compatible with confidentiality considerations and the need to preserve the effectiveness
ofactions by regulatory and oversight agencies. Changes in the setting ofmonetary policy
instruments (other than fine-tunning measures) and significant changes in financial policies
should be publicly announced and explained in a timely manner. Public consultations within
an appropriate time period should be undertaken for proposea substantive technical changes

.•
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to the structure ofmonetary and financial regulations. Periodic public statements on pro1:,rress
toward achieving monetary policy ol1jective(s) as well as prospects for-achieving them are
to be issued by central banks and in the case of financial agencies, the reports should focus
on how their overall policy objectives are being achieved, in addition. the regulations on
data reporting by financial Institutions to the central banks for monetary policy purposes
should be publicly disclosed.
III.
On the issue of public availability of information on monetary policy. the Code
recommends that presentations and releases of central bank data should meet the standards
related to coverage, periodicity, timeliness ofdata and access by the public that are consistent
with the IMF 's data dissemination standards.3 In addition, the Code encourages central
banks to publicly disclose Its balance sheet on a pre-announced schedule and, after a
predetermined interval, publicly disclose selected information on its aggregate transactions.
Texts ofthe regulations issued by the central bank should be readily available to the public
while public information services should be established and maintained by the central bank.
In this context, the central bank should have a publication schedule, including an Annual
Report and senior central bank officials should be ready to explain their institution's
objective(s) and performances to the public and, in addition, release the text ofthe statements
to the public. The same principles apply in the case ofpublic availability ofinformation on
financial policies with slight modifications to take account of differences in institutional
arrangements. In this regard, financial agencies are encouraged to issue periodic public
reports on the major developments ofthe sector( s) ofthe financial system for Which they
carry designated responsibility; they should seek to e nsure that, consistent with
confidentiality requirements, there Is public reporting of aggregate data related to their
jurisdictional responsibilities on a timely and regular basis; and where there are deposit
insurance guarantees, policyholder guarantees, and any other client asset protection schemes.
Information on the nature and form of such protections, on the operating procedures. on
how the guarantee is financed, and o n the performance of th.e arrangement, should be
publicly disclosed.

1

T he term "central bank" in the Code refers to the institution responsible for conducting monetary policy. which
may or m ay not be a central bank while "financial agencies" is used to refer to the inst itutional arrangements for
the regulation, supervision, and oversight ofthe financial and payments systems. including markets and institutions.
w ith the view to promoting financial stability, market efficiency, and client-asset and consumer protection.
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IV.
Regarding the fourth element on accountability and assurances oflntegrity by
central banks and financial agencies, the Codudvocates that officials ofthe central bank
and relevant financial agencies should be available to appear before a designated public
i;iUthority to report on the conduct of monetary and financial policies, explain the policy
objective(s) of their Institutions, describe their performance in achieving/pursuing their
objective(s), and, as appropriate, exchange views on the state ofthe economy and financial
system. In addition, audited financial statements of their operations should be publicly
disclosed on a pre-announced schedule while operating expenses and revenues should be
publicly disclosed annually. Public disclosure of standards for the conduct of personal
financial affairs ofofficials and staffand rules to prevent exploitation ofconflict ofinterest,
including any general fiduciary obligations is also recommended by the Code.

Transparency and Disclosure Limits:
1tis pertinent at this juncture to draw attention to the potential limits to transparency,
which the Code has fully recognized. Thus, the adoption of the codes should be weighted
against the potential costs and, in particular, required adaptation to Individual country
circumstances, taking into account the benefits and limitations oftransparency that could
be affected by specific policy and Institutional circumstances. Consequently, limits on
transparency are allowed where in<sreasedtransparency could undermine the effectiveness
ofpolicies or decision-making or be potentially harmful to market stability. For example,
extensive disclosure requirements about the internal policy discussion on key operations
of the central bank, such cl!) money and foreign exchange market operations, might disrupt
the markets, constrain the free flow ofdiscussion by policy makers or prevent the adoption
ofcontingency plans and near-term implementation tactics. Thus, it may be justifiable for
the central bank not to disclose its internal deliberations and documentation, contingency
plans, near-term implementation tactics, and Information on foreign exchange operations.
1

See Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). (IMF. March 1996). and General Data Dissemination
System (ODDS). (JMF. December 1997). The SDDS serves to guide countries that have, or that might seek,
access to international capital markets in the dissemination of economic and financial data to the public and
encourages [Fund] member countries to follow good statistical practices in four dimensions relating to data
coverage, periodicity and timeliness of data disseminated; access by the public; integrity; and_quality. The G DDS
serves to: guide countries in the provision to the public of comprehensive, timely, accessible and reliable
economic, financial and socio-demographic data; encourage member countries to improve data quality; and
provide a framework for evaluating needs for data improvement and setting priorities in this respect. The
framework of the ODDS is also built around the same four dimensions as the SDDS.
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Similarly. in order to maintain access to sensitive information from market participants.
there is also need to saf~guard the confidentiality and privacy oTinformation on individual
participants in the market.

III.

THE ROLE OF THE CBN IN THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CODE IN NIGERIA
Although, the implementation of the Code in member countries of the Fund is
voluntary, it is pertinent to note that, as a member ofthe International financial community,
it is in best interest ofthe CBN to adopt the Code and ensure its effective implementation
within the limits practicable. Its adoption in Nigeria is even more compelling now than at
any other time, as the country is warming up to the intemational community and canvassing
for increased flow of financial resources to reva: 11p its ailing economy. I envisage •that
greater transparency is likely to play a significant role in facilitating investment flows in
future to the extent that Inwstors mc.iy begin to view the issue seriously in their investmentdecisions, even though the implementation of the Code is not mandatory. The recent
agreement reached with the Fund on a Stand-by Arrangement, has further reinforced the
need for CBN to seriously emphasize the adoption and implementation of the Code
particularly with respect to the issue of data dissemination standard. With CBN having
overall responsibility for the supervision ofall financial Institutions in the country, ~der the
an1ended Act, the role of the Bank in the effective Implementation ot the code of good
practices in monetary and financial policies cannot be overemphasized.
Having highlighted the main elements and salient f~atures of the Code in the
preceding section, let me now tum attention to how the Central Bank ofNigeria (CBN)
will facilitate the effective implementation ofthe Code in Nigeria. Essentially, 1 see the role
of the CBN as that of a facilitator because to a large extent, some of the good practices
recommended in the Code are.already in place, either in the authorizing legislation ( as may
be necessary) or in the actual conduct of affairs by the CBN. With regard to the main
elements ofthe Code, I will partieularly, like to refer you to Parts I, IV and V-VIII ofthe
Central Bank of Nigeria Decree No. 24 of 1 991, as amended, which have to some
degree, accommodated some ofthe good practices that have been identified in the Code
and the Supporting Document. This is, however, not to suggest that there is no room for
·improvement on how things are currently being done in the Bank.
In general, meaningful transparency depends on the means ofdisclosure and the
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quality oftransparency. Effective transparency calls for concerted efforts on the part of
national authorities to build public understanding ofthe objectives ofpolicy, the nature of
responsibilities ofthe authorities, and the policy process. Promoting public understanding
ofthese issues involves the authorities being active in developing and conveying information,
using various means available to these institutions to disclose information, and customizing
the message according to the needs of the particular audiences. The role of the CBN In
the effective implementation of the Code In Nigena could, therefore, be discussed under
the following subheadings: means of disclosure, quality oftransparency, data, facilitator,
and Internal operations of the Bank.

(a)

Means of Disclosure

The CBN with its assigned roles and responsibilities, as defined in the Act establishing it
and the Banks and Other Financial Institutions (BOFI) Decree 25 of 1991, as amended,
needs to enhance its involvement in devel9ping and conveying infonr.ation on its operations
to the public. In this regard, the existing channels through which the Bank communicates
with the public should be improved and made readily accessible to the public. For example,
the CBN Act, which should be a public document is not readily available and/or accessible
to the public while the language texts of the legislation and regulation are often technical
and complex. To make transparency effective, the CBN may consider it expedient to post
the text ofthe laws and regulations on its website when this is established. The import of
this is that the CBN Act and the BOFI Decree contain explicit description of the roles,
responsibilities, and objectives of the Central Bank ofNigeria for monetary policy and
financial policies. Making them readily available and accessible will help the public to
appreciate the Bank's role and assist them in assessing the performance and credibility of
the Bank.
Other means of disclosure currently available to the CBN for effective conduct of
transparency in Nigeria and which needs to be improved include the various official
publications (half-yearly, quarterly or monthly reviews or bulletins), annual reports, press
releases, statutory reports to the legislature (National Assembly) and the public on aspects
ofits policies and functions. Public release ofthe memorandum ofunderstanding (MOU)
between CBN and other institutions particularly where there are overlapping responsibilities
and relationships between and among different institutions including consultancy arrangements
(such as between CBN and NDIC in the area of bank examination, amongst others) is
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another means ofdisclosure and, hence, transparency. However, the disclosure ofany
MOU should take cognizance of the sensitive nature of the issues involved, which may
limit its disclosure.
The CBN can also improve transparency by publicly releasing and making readily
available its mission statement and/or through regular discussion and explanation in the
Bank's various publications, public statements and public appearances, and/or putting it
on the web site.
It is pertinent to note that, effective transparency requires the use ofmore than one
ofthese forms ofdisclosure and whatever means are adopted, their timeliness is equal!y
fundamental. This is perhaps where the web sites become indispensable tools of
communicating to the public.
(b)

Quality ofTransparency

Closely related to the form oftransparency is the quality of in formation disclosed. It is the
content, clarity and accessibility of the information or data that are being disclosed that
transforms "disclosure" into ''transparency." Thus, creating effective transparency requires
more thanjust making information available aboutpoticy objectives, responsibilities, policy
decisions, and performance results. The CBN has an important role to play in the effective
implementation ofthe Code by ensuring that the quality of information is such that the
credibility ofthe Bank is not questioned. Thus, the Bank's role should be to ensure that
statements and repons contain meaningful and relevant Information and should be released
on a timely basis. The content o,f the disclosure is critical to the efficient functioning of
markets, which will only increase in importance as changes in international trading and
financial arrangements evolve and markets become more sophisticated. Failure to present
public statements and reports on monetary and financial policy issues with appropriate
content could undermine the credibility of the CBN and thus become counterproductive.
The CBN should focus attention on the tangibility and relevance ofthe information
being provided to the public. The objective of transparency would not be met ifreports
released offer contradictory assessments, multiple reports are issued, or if regulations are
written in highly technical or archaic language. Similarly, inconsistent application of
transparency practices (like reversing previously applied transparency practices in
unfavourable situations), would go against the spirit and intent of transparency and could
weaken credibility. Thus, the CBN's role in this regard would be to guard against Issuing
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statements and reports that are ambiguous and subject to different Interpretations by
different individuals and/or groups. In addition, it should avoid Issuing multiple and
-contradictory reports/regulations or applying transparency inconsistently so as not to
undermine its credibility. Overall, for monetary policy transparency, the CBN should
condition the scope for being transparent and the nature oftransparency by the nature of
the monetary policy regime.

(c)
Data
Another area where CBN's role is crucial for the effective implementation of the Code in
Nigeria is related to data disclosure, which is an important aspect of the Code ofGood
Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies. The CBN should
champion the adoption ofthe guidelines and procedures ofthe IMF' s data dissemination
standards.and other standards developed by different international organizations and
associations aimed at presenting readily accessible data on an orderly and timely basis,
with emphasis on reliabiiity. Without adequate, reliable, accurate, qualitative and timely
data, efforts at achieving greater transparency would come to naught and wrong information
would be disseminated to stakeholders. Data problems in Nigeria is perhaps the single
most important potential threat to the effective implementation of the Code. In the past,
reservations about the quality and reliability ofNigeria' s data related to all sectors, except
the financial sector. In recent times, however, doubts have been cast even on the quality of
monetary and financial data, including CBN own's balance sheet data. It is worth mentioning
at this point that, if the Bank l0oses grip on providing credible data in its area of primary
responsibilities. then all hope would he lost because CBN is probably the only institution in
the country on which users of statistics and/or stakeholders rely.
The CBN collects and compiles various statistics for the purpose ofappraising its
policies and conducting research on financial and economic Issues. Based on the
understanding that "statistics are public goods," the CBN's role should be to provide
reliable statistics in a timely manner, and every effort should be directed toward achieving
that goal. This is particularly Important because the structure of the economy and the
financial sector has changed substantially and riew initiatives in information technology has
been developed to spread information quickly. Moreover, the environment surrounding
monetary and economic statistics has also been transformed rapidly . Under these
circwnstances, expectations are increasing, mwnly of statistics users, for the expansion
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and improvement of stati stics to ~nhance the convenience of their use. In view of the
above, the C BN h?.s a roh.: to pla~ In enhancing the quality of statistics it provides by,
among others: (i) providing accurate statistics that portrays the true conditions of the
economy precisely; (ii) enhancing the convenience for users, with increased emphasis on
timeliness, by establishing a web site, which provides access to a wide range of users, so
that users can grasp the economic situation at an early stage; (iii) improving efficiency of
collecting and compiling statistics through on-line system thus, reducing the burden on
respondents; (iv) increasing transparency by disclosing the entire process of collecting,
compiling and releasing statistics. In this regard, the rules on releasing statistics, and disclosing
the survey and estimation methods ofthe statistics should be clarified and where appropriate
a schedule for releasing statistics established: (v) tightening security with respect to
confidential information; and (vi) maintaining a neutral stance when releasing statistics, that
is, policy judgements or interpretations should not be added.
Furthermore, since the Bank is also a major user of statistics generated by other datagenerating agencies, it has a stake in ensuring the quality and consistency ofdata generated
by these other agencies. In this respect, the Bank needs to collaborate with these other
agencies and, ifpossible, provide technical assistance such that statistics provided by them
are consistent with the underlying economic conditions that informed changes in monetary
and financial policies.
(d)

Facilitator
The CBN also has a facilitator's role to play in ensuring the effective Implementation
of the Code of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial policies. The
CBN as chairman ofthe Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC),
should provide effective leadership in ensuring efficiency in the discharge ofthe responsibilities
assigned to the Committee.4 It is a matter for concern that since its establishment, the
Committee is yet to make itc; impact felt in terms ofthe envisaged coordination of regulatory
and supervisory activities. Each member institution appears to be heading in adifTerent
direction without regard to the effects of its activities on the other members. This should he
corrected. In addition, the CBN should embark on a public enlightenment campaign through
seminars/workshops on transparency and involvement of various institutions in the financial
sector that have a stake in enhancing transparency practices by the Bank through
tnformation/data provided by them. In this way, the Bank wou ld have succeeded in
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sensitizing these institutions on the Code and creating awareness ofthe need to provide
accurate. reliable and good quality data to the supervising agencies. This could be
complemented by sponsoring annual conferences on topical economic Issues, as is done
by most cemral banks. Participation in such conferences should be extended to the
academia, economic practitioners and policy makers to elicit cross-fertiliz.ation ofideas
and interactions outside the CBN on national economic issues. Finally, the CBN should
encourage the fiscal arm ofthe government to also adopt the Code of Good Practices on
Fiscal Transparency to complement the adoption ofthe MFP Transparency Code in Nigeria
(e)
Improvement in CBN's Internal Operations
CBN's role in the effective implementation ofthe Code would be enhanced ifthe
Bank embarks on. improving its internal operations through the adoption of appropriate
technology, particularly IT, in addition to establishing a functional web site that is readily
available and accessible to the public. Let me, however, quickly acknowledge that these
issues are currently receiving attention under the ongoing restructuring and re-engineering
exercise, code-named "Project EAGLES," ofthe present CBN management.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The focus of the Code is on transparency. It is directed essentially at the
transparency practices ofcentral banks and financial agencies and, not on the transparency
procedures relating to firms and individual institutions. While good transparency practices
for the fonnulation and reporting of monetary and financial policies help to contribute to
the adoption of sound policies, the Code is not designed to pass judgements on the
appropriateness or desirability of specific monetary and financial policies or frameworks
that countries should adopt. In addition. transparency is not an end in itself nor is it a
substitute for pursuing sound policies, rather it complements sound policies. The Code
recognizes that the implementation ofthe transparency practices differ between countries,
reflecting the peculiarities ofindividual country's environment, both ecooomic and regulatory.
This, should be Implemented with flexibility and with due regard to peculiar circumstances.
The adoption ofthe Code should enhance the! effectiveness ofmonetary and financial
policies in Nigeria. With the instrument autonomy granted to the CBN, the Code should
help the Bank to meet the expectations ofvarious stakeholders. Similarly, transparency by
financial agencies should contribute to policy effectiveness by financial market participants
to assess the Impact of financial policies, thereby, reducing uncertainties in their decision
IV.
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making. By enabling market participants and !he general public to understand and evaluate
financial policies, transparency is likely to contribute to making good policies. This would
help promote financial and systemic stability as well as reduce the potential for moral
hazards. Transparency, however, has its potential limitations which should be accommodated
in evolving transparency practices.
The role ofthe Central Bank ofNigeria in the effective implementation of the
Code in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. The role transcends various frontiers including
evolving alternative means of disclosures, quality oftransparency, data enhancements,
timeliness ofdisclosure and dissemination ofinformation, public education/enlightenment
on what transparency entails and the benefits that art. derivable from greater transparency.
In addition, improvement in the internal operations of the CBN through the adoption of
appropriate IT, including establishing a web site, is critical to the effective implementation
ofthe Code in Nigeria Finally, regular self-assessment and evaluation study on where the
Bank stands vis-a-vis the Code that can easily be assessed by the public will go a long
way iP facilitating the effective implementation ofthe Code.

See Part VII -38A :ind 388) of the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991. as amended. Ior the membership and ohje,tives
of the Committee.

